Do à la carte menus serve infertility patients? The ethics and regulation of in vitro fertility add-ons by Wilkinson, Jack et al.
Do à la carte menus serve infertility patients? The ethics and regulation
of in vitro fertility add-ons
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101703/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Wilkinson, Jack, Malpas, Phillipa, Hammarberg, Karin, Tsigdinos, Pamela Mahoney,
Lensen, Sarah, Jackson, Emily, Harper, Joyce and Moll, Ben W (2019) Do à la 
carte menus serve infertility patients? The ethics and regulation of in vitro 
fertility add-ons. Fertility and Sterility, 112 (6). 973 - 977. ISSN 0015-0282 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fertnstert.2019.09.028
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Do à la carte menus serve infertility 1 
patients? The ethics and regulation of IVF 2 
add-ons. 3 
 4 
Jack Wilkinson, Ph.D1*, Phillipa Malpas, Ph.D2, Karin Hammarberg, Ph.D3, Pamela Mahoney 5 
Tsigdinos, MA4, Sarah Lensen, Ph.D 5, Emily Jackson, FBA 6, Joyce Harper, Ph.D7, Ben W Mol, 6 
M.D, Ph.D8. 7 
 8 
1 Centre for Biostatistics, Manchester Academic Health Science Centre, University of Manchester, 9 
Manchester, UK. 10 
2  Psychological Medicine, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Auckland, New 11 
Zealand. 12 
3 Jean Hailes Research Unit, School of Public Health and Preventative Medicine, Monash University, 13 
Australia. 14 
4 Silent Sorority, silentsorority.com, USA.  15 
5 Cochrane Gynecology and Fertility Group, University of Auckland, NZ. 16 
6 Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. 17 
7 Department of Reproductive Health, Institute for Women’s Health, University College London, UK. 18 
8 Evidence based Women’s Health Care Research Group, Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 19 
Monash University, Australia. 20 
 21 
*Corresponding author. Jack.wilkinson@manchester.ac.uk . Centre for Biostatistics, University of 22 
Manchester, 1.320 Jean McFarlane Building, University Place, Oxford Rd, M13 9PL. 23 
Running title: The ethics and regulation of IVF add-ons 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
Abstract 28 
Add-on treatments are the new black. They are provided (most frequently, sold) to people undergoing 29 
in vitro fertilization on the premise that they will improve the chances of having a baby. However, the 30 
regulation of add-ons is consistently minimal, meaning that they are introduced into routine practice 31 
before they have been shown to improve the live birth rate. Debate over the adequacy of this light-touch 32 
approach rages. Defenders argue that demands for a rigorous approval process are paternalistic, since 33 
this would delay access to promising treatments. Critics respond that promising treatments may turn 34 
out to have adverse effects on patients and their offspring, contradicting the clinician’s responsibility to 35 
do no harm. Some add-ons, including earlier versions of PGT-A, might even reduce the live birth rate, 36 
raising the prospect of desperate patients paying more to worsen their chances. Informed consent 37 
represents a solution in principle, but in practice there is a clear tension between impartial information 38 
and direct-to-consumer advertising. Because the effects of a treatment can’t be known until it has been 39 
robustly evaluated, we argue that strong evidence should be required before add-ons are introduced to 40 
the clinic. In the meantime, there is an imperative to identify methods for communicating the associated 41 
risks and uncertainties of add-ons to prospective patients.  42 
 43 
Capsule 44 
How should IVF add-ons be regulated? Is it ethical to provide unproven treatments? How can we inform 45 
patients about the risks and uncertainties? 46 
. 47 
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Introduction 54 
The decision to seek treatment for infertility usually follows from a failure to conceive naturally, often 55 
after years of trying. The investment of the couple is physical, emotional, and in non-public health 56 
systems, financial. Nobody has IVF on a whim. 57 
  58 
The likelihood that treatment will result in a live birth varies considerably depending on the patient’s 59 
prognostic profile, and in some populations first line treatments such as intra-uterine insemination (for 60 
unexplained or mild-male infertility) or ovulation induction (for anovulatory infertility) have a high 61 
success rate (1, 2). Despite this, IVF is often employed as the default first line treatment for patients 62 
presenting with various kinds of subfertility, causing some commentators to suggest that it is overused 63 
(3). Unfortunately, IVF frequently doesn’t result in a baby; the US national report of the Society for 64 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART) puts the cumulative live birth rate per attempted egg 65 
retrieval at 37% (4). Although multiple IVF attempts may increase the cumulative chance of live birth, 66 
many patients do not have babies as a result of their treatment. Each time treatment fails, patients are 67 
faced with a choice: give up or try again. Patients may feel that they have to make this decision under 68 
time pressure, and that delays deliberating could very well cause them to lose their opportunity to 69 
conceive and have children. These concerns might be exaggerated, since material decline in fertility 70 
manifests over a timespan of years rather than months, but may be voiced by some treatment providers. 71 
Moreover, patients often have to decide which clinic to attend in order to maximise their chance of 72 
success. 73 
  74 
This situation creates competition for patients, and IVF clinics frequently market themselves both by 75 
emphasising their superior performance (not always with veracity (5-7) and by offering to make 76 
people’s ‘dreams come true’ (8). Attempting to gain a competitive edge, or perhaps simply hoping to 77 
maintain parity with rivals, clinics offer optional add-on treatments to people undergoing IVF. These 78 
add-ons are non-essential interventions which may be offered to people undergoing IVF with the claim 79 
that they will increase the chance of success, such as endometrial scratching, embryo glue, steroids to 80 
suppress immunity, or preimplantation genetic testing for aneuploidy (PGT-A). While data on global 81 
patterns of add-on usage are limited, a UK survey of clinic-users initiated by the Human Fertilisation 82 
and Embryology Authority (HFEA) reported that 74% of respondents had used at least one add-on, that 83 
usage was growing, and that usage was greater with privately funded treatment (9). Add-ons should be 84 
distinguished from additional procedures that are rendered necessary by some diagnoses (such as 85 
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) or surgical sperm retrieval for some couples with severe male 86 
factor infertility). They should also be distinguished from treatments that are integral to IVF. For 87 
example, although we can debate which ovarian stimulation protocol is most effective and safe, IVF 88 
typically requires some form of ovarian stimulation to be performed, and so we would not consider any 89 
particular protocol to constitute an ‘add-on’. If add-on interventions were unequivocally effective 90 
(improving the cumulative live birth rate per started cycle), their sale would not pose an ethical 91 
quandary. However, robust supportive studies of the effectiveness of these procedures are lacking, with 92 
no add-on therapy being given the green light in a recent review of the evidence in the United Kingdom 93 
(10). Given the considerable uncertainty around whether add-ons work, questions arise regarding the 94 
appropriateness of offering them to patients who are often desperate, and believe that clinics rely on 95 
validated science for all treatments. Is it ever acceptable to offer, and sell, treatments of unclear 96 
effectiveness and safety? Under what circumstances? How should this be regulated and how should any 97 
regulation be implemented? 98 
  99 
  100 
How are add on treatments regulated? 101 
  102 
The regulation of IVF add-ons is consistently minimal (11). Usually, new fertility interventions are 103 
rapidly adopted on the basis of case reports, rather than following formal regulatory review (12). In the 104 
United States, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only requires a full benefit/ risk evaluation 105 
when human cellular and tissue-based products are manipulated to a “more-than-minimal” degree (13) 106 
in (12). So far, no fertility intervention has been considered as meeting this criterion. In the United 107 
Kingdom, HFEA has limited power to prevent the sale of add-ons, or to control pricing (14). When 108 
considering a new treatment, HFEA can only refuse it on the grounds of safety; effectiveness is not a 109 
consideration. However, the UK regulator has issued a consensus statement in conjunction with industry 110 
and patient stakeholder groups outlining several principles of responsible innovation (15). These state 111 
that add-ons may be offered even when there is little or conflicting evidence provided that information 112 
about the current state of knowledge is given to patients. Where there is no evidence of efficacy and 113 
safety, the statement advises that treatments should only be offered as part of research. Both the HFEA 114 
and the Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority (VARTA) in Australia provide 115 
information to consumers to make them aware that add-ons may not improve their chance of success 116 
(10, 16). However, there is no such regulatory body in the U.S, nor in most other countries. 117 
 118 
 119 
Self-regulation, in conjunction with market forces, appears to represent the standard for regulation of 120 
IVF innovations in many parts of the world. This is not just true for Western nations (17) (18). 121 
Consequently, in markets such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Slovenia where very little IVF is 122 
privately funded and most is delivered in state hospitals (19) use of add-ons is believed to be lower, 123 
although data are lacking. 124 
 125 
 126 
 127 
How should IVF add-ons be regulated? Current proposals 128 
 129 
 130 
While the status quo amounts to a self-regulated free-for-all driven largely by commercial pressures, it 131 
is unclear whether or not this will persist. Both executive and popular interest in add-ons has increased, 132 
partially as a result of high-profile media coverage of the topic in the UK (20), and this may lead to 133 
some form of regulatory response from policy makers.  134 
 135 
 136 
However, support for changes to the regulatory framework surrounding new reproductive treatments is 137 
far from universal. Although arguments in favour of more stringent regulation have been advanced (12, 138 
21-24), there have also been defences of current standards (25-27). A key argument in favour of reform 139 
states that self-regulation is an unsuitable model for IVF. A free market in goods and services relies 140 
upon consumers choosing not to buy useless products. If a mobile phone company were to produce a 141 
new high tech phone which did not work, then after an initial flurry of interest in the new product, its 142 
failings would become apparent and the market for it would disappear. Because there can be no 143 
guarantee that any cycle of IVF will lead to the birth of a baby, a cycle is more likely to fail than it is to 144 
work, and because patients only experience the outcome of their own situation, it is much harder for 145 
consumers of infertility services to tell for themselves whether an add-on treatment is worth purchasing. 146 
Rather than relying on individual patients ‘voting with their feet’ in order to crowd out useless 147 
interventions, it may be necessary instead for an expert regulator to make recommendations for them. 148 
 149 
 150 
On the other side of the fence, proponents of the status quo emphasise the point that any regulatory 151 
delay might deprive patients of beneficial treatments (27). Supporters of this view generally frame the 152 
potential effects of add-ons as being neutral at worst. Under this framing, the call for tighter regulation 153 
is both paternalistic and perverse; patients are being “chided” by reformers for wanting to leave no stone 154 
unturned (27). It is an effective argumentative device; if it were true then there would be no debate to 155 
be had. It is, nonetheless, a red herring, because unfortunately some innovations do turn out to worsen 156 
patient outcomes. This can be true even of well-established treatments that are routinely used (28). For 157 
example, many embryos that were reported to be abnormal (mosaic) following PGT-A were discarded, 158 
but we now know they can lead to normal pregnancies and they are frequently transferred. As a result, 159 
it now appears that many patients who paid for earlier versions of PGT-A reduced their chance of having 160 
a baby (29). 161 
 162 
 163 
Except in cases where treatment effects are very large and stable (30-32), it is not known whether a 164 
treatment is beneficial or disadvantageous until it has been robustly evaluated, although this point 165 
sometimes gets lost amidst the excitement of having a new treatment to employ and a new product to 166 
sell. It can be difficult to remove an ineffective or harmful treatment from use once it has been widely 167 
adopted, both due to the enthusiasm of clinicians and the preferences of patients. For example, a recent 168 
large randomised controlled trial of the add-on treatment endometrial scratching suggested that the 169 
painful procedure has little or no effect on live birth rates (33), but this has been greeted with claims 170 
that it might work for some specific categories of infertile women (34). Intracytoplasmic sperm 171 
injection for non-male factor subfertility remains common, despite a lack of randomised evidence in its 172 
favour. If a trial had been mandated prior to the introduction of the techniques, the widespread provision 173 
of ineffective treatments could have been prevented. 174 
 175 
 176 
Consequently, it has been argued that full regulatory review should be required before the introduction 177 
of a new reproductive treatment unless there are no more than minimal safety issues compared to the 178 
current standard, there is no risk of reduced live birth rates, and there are no risks of societal harm (12). 179 
Very few add-ons would meet all three of these conditions, particularly when potential risks to offspring 180 
are considered (12) (21) (22). An ideal paradigm for the development and introduction of new 181 
embryological techniques has been described, beginning with hypothesis-driven basic research and 182 
moving through stages of animal testing, research on donated human embryos, and clinical trials of 183 
increasing magnitude and scope, culminating in a thorough health technology assessment (21). The use 184 
of animal models is unlikely to be applicable for many interventions, due to the fact that physiological 185 
differences may obfuscate effects in humans (see the example of ICSI,  (21, 26)). On the other hand, 186 
with few exceptions, the clinical benefit of most interventions can and should be evaluated in a 187 
randomised trial (32). 188 
 189 
 190 
  191 
Informed consent when effectiveness is questionable 192 
  193 
Patient-centred, evidence-based medicine is a collaborative enterprise with patients and health 194 
professionals focused on the medical needs of the patient, and a relationship grounded in trust, fidelity, 195 
and veracity (35).  Respecting the choices of patients who have made informed decisions about their 196 
medical preferences lies at the heart of informed consent and reflects the principle of autonomy in 197 
practice. Obtaining informed consent places duties on clinicians to ensure patients understand the risks 198 
and benefits of proceeding with an intervention by providing relevant information, as well as clarifying 199 
incomplete or misleading information, and ensuring that patients are making decisions without coercion 200 
or undue pressure (36). As informed consent is only possible if sufficient information on effectiveness 201 
and safety is available, there should be pressure on developers and suppliers of the add-on interventions 202 
to generate such information. Given concerns around add-on interventions in a low-regulation context, 203 
the challenges for patients are clear: effectiveness will rarely be known with certainty yet patients want, 204 
and often need, to make decisions now. Most add-on interventions are effectively experimental; the 205 
claims made on some fertility websites are not quantified and evidence is not cited to support such 206 
claims (7); and the potential risks for both women and offspring undergoing add-on interventions are 207 
unknown. 208 
 209 
 210 
Neither can these concerns be seen in isolation to other relevant aspects: the social pressures on patients 211 
to have children; one’s desperation to have a child of one’s own (37), possible conflicts of interest 212 
between commercial providers and their obligation to act in the patient’s best interests (38, 39), and the 213 
vulnerabilities of patients (including their financial welfare). Ensuring that patients are supported to 214 
make an informed choice that reflects their preferences and values may be especially challenging within 215 
this context. Concerns around financial conflict of interest are heightened by the prospect of 216 
corporatisation of reproductive care; some umbrella organisations representing several IVF clinics are 217 
listed companies, so their primary interest is shareholder profit. In a clinical setting, one way to expand 218 
a business is to treat to excess, which includes selling additional unnecessary treatments to patients and 219 
treating people who don’t need to be treated (38). Informing people that they don’t need to buy your 220 
product is antithetical to raising the stock price, and this is the core tension between informed patient 221 
choice and direct to consumer marketing. 222 
 223 
 224 
Increasing the range of infertility treatment add-ons in recent years has created new ethical challenges. 225 
Is more choice necessarily a good thing for patients? Some may argue providing choices aligns with 226 
respecting patient autonomy. Yet autonomy’s reach is limited and cannot be seen in isolation of the 227 
health professional’s duty not to provide treatments that are ineffective, futile, or of questionable safety  228 
(40). Moreover, giving patients more choice may not always be in their best interests (41). Even where 229 
a patient may pay the full cost for an add-on intervention, it may be justifiable to limit their choices 230 
when the add-on’s effects are unlikely to contribute to the goals of a successful pregnancy. Where there 231 
is a substantive possibility that the add-on may actually reduce the patient’s chance of success, the 232 
principle of non-maleficence may be brought to bear (40). 233 
 234 
 235 
 236 
Where do we go next? 237 
 238 
 239 
In the absence of mandatory regulatory review of new reproductive interventions, and in light of the 240 
minimal restrictions on how clinics advertise their products, the question becomes how best to inform 241 
prospective patients so that they can make a genuinely well-informed, autonomous decision regarding 242 
how to be treated (36).  243 
 244 
 245 
The establishment of consensus-based classifications of treatments might be one option. For example, 246 
a scoring tool has been developed by the ESHRE special interest groups in Ethics and Law, and Safety 247 
and Quality in ART to distinguish between experimental, innovative and established treatments (42). 248 
The tool incorporates four domains: efficacy, safety, procedural reliability and transparency and 249 
effectiveness. Treatments must pass a threshold in all four in order to achieve a higher classification. In 250 
addition to the criteria for categorising infertility interventions, there is a need to identify effective 251 
methods for communicating the risk and uncertainty of add-ons to prospective patients (such as the 252 
EPIC fertility add-ons project: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bdAnfkKd2YGp5qd). General 253 
proposals for conveying research results to lay audiences have been made (43) but have not been 254 
successful in this goal (43, 44). 255 
 256 
 257 
It is likely that a bespoke approach to risk communication may be required for infertility treatments, 258 
since the multistage nature of IVF means that success rates can be presented using a variety of 259 
denominators (5). This can change both the impression of an intervention’s effectiveness (the live birth 260 
rate for PGT-A looks better when calculated per transfer procedure, but worse when calculated per 261 
cycle started) as well as the meaning and relevance of the statistic. It is asking too much of patients to 262 
parse statistical subtleties, despite suggestions from some authors that patients “must be critical of the 263 
information they are exposed to” (45). Nevertheless, encouraging patients to ask the five questions 264 
recommended by the Choosing Wisely campaign, before having any test, treatment or procedure, might 265 
help them make more informed decisions: ‘Do I really need this test, treatment or procedure?’; ‘What 266 
are the risks?’; ‘Are there simpler, safer options?’, ‘What happens if I don’t do anything’; and ‘What 267 
are the costs’ (www.choosingwisely.org.au). In the context of IVF, we might add ‘how will this 268 
treatment affect my chances of a live birth?’ Informed consent also requires that any uncertainties, for 269 
example around the size of an intervention’s effect, are communicated to patients, since patients may 270 
have individual opinions about the monetary value of modest increases in birth rate. The quantification 271 
and reduction of this uncertainty is, of course, one of the principal motivations for conducting 272 
randomised controlled trials. The development of decision aids for patients, based on high-quality 273 
evidence, could be useful in this space. 274 
 275 
 276 
Supposing a suitable mode of information can be identified, it remains to work out how this information 277 
should be passed to patients. It would be desirable for patients to have this information brought to their 278 
attention at the point of care, but the commercial setting might make impartial consultancy challenging. 279 
One proposal arising from a recent executive review is the development of “compliance standards for 280 
the provision of information in relation to adjuvant treatments, which includes a requirement to advise 281 
patients how to access the resources developed by the regulators” (46). The report goes on to 282 
recommend that these compliance standards should be included in the conditions of clinic registration. 283 
But of course, this will not be the only information that patients rely upon when deciding whether to 284 
pay for additional treatment services. People with infertility often report doing their own research before 285 
embarking on treatment, and this generally means gathering material online, often from blogs and 286 
Facebook groups, where the quality and accuracy of information may be distinctly variable (9).  287 
 288 
 289 
Poor information provision about research leading to excessive intervention has been included in a 290 
recently proposed taxonomy of abuse in assisted reproductive technologies (47). It has become clear 291 
that self-regulation cannot be relied upon to protect patients from ineffective and unnecessary treatment, 292 
particularly in settings where IVF is privately funded. While industry opposition is inevitable, stronger 293 
regulation appears to have broad support (48). Until that time comes, the best way to empower both 294 
consumers and caregivers is to find ways to translate our knowledge about add-ons in a way that does 295 
justice to any risks and uncertainties. Nonetheless, the moral imperative to reduce those risks and 296 
uncertainties remains strong. 297 
 298 
Acknowledgements  299 
This work (JW) was supported by the Wellcome Institutional Strategic Support Fund award 300 
[204796/Z/16/Z]. 301 
 302 
References 303 
 304 
1. Gunn DD, Bates GW. Evidence-based approach to unexplained infertility: a systematic 305 
review. Fertil Steril 2016;105:1566-74 e1. 306 
 307 
2. ESHRE Capri Workshop Group. A prognosis-based approach to infertility: understanding the 308 
role of time. Hum Reprod 2017;32:1556-9. 309 
 310 
3. Kamphuis EI, Bhattacharya S, van der Veen F, Mol BW, Templeton A, Evidence Based IVFG. 311 
Are we overusing IVF? BMJ 2014;348:g252. 312 
 313 
4. Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies. National Summary Report 2017. In, 2019. 314 
5. Wilkinson J, Vail A, Roberts SA. Direct-to-consumer advertising of success rates for medically 315 
assisted reproduction: a review of national clinic websites. BMJ open 2017;7:e012218. 316 
 317 
6. Hammarberg K, Prentice T, Purcell I, Johnson L. Quality of information about success rates 318 
provided on assisted reproductive technology clinic websites in Australia and New Zealand. Aust N Z 319 
J Obstet Gynaecol 2018;58:330-4. 320 
 321 
7. Spencer EA, Mahtani KR, Goldacre B, Heneghan C. Claims for fertility interventions: a 322 
systematic assessment of statements on UK fertility centre websites. BMJ open 2016;6:e013940. 323 
 324 
8. Hawkins J. Selling ART: An Empirical Assessment of Advertising on Fertility Clinics' Websites. 325 
Indiana Law J 2013;88:1147-79. 326 
 327 
9. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Pilot national fertility patient survey. 2018. 328 
https://www.hfea.gov.uk/media/2702/pilot-national-fertility-patient-survey-2018.pdf, accessed Aug 2019. 329 
 330 
10. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Treatment add-ons. 2019. 331 
https://www.hfea.gov.uk/treatments/explore-all-treatments/treatment-add-ons/, accessed July 2019. 332 
 333 
11. Nardo LG, El-Toukhy T, Stewart J, Balen AH, Potdar N. British Fertility Society Policy and 334 
Practice Committee: adjuvants in IVF: evidence for good clinical practice. Hum Fertil (Camb) 335 
2015;18:2-15. 336 
 337 
12. Hendriks S, Pearson SD. A proposed framework for strengthening regulatory review of 338 
innovative reproductive techniques in the United States. In:  Fertil Steril Dialog, 2018. 339 
 340 
13. Food and Drug Administration. Human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products; 341 
establishment registration and listing. Food and Drug Administration, HHS. Final rule. Fed Regist 342 
2001;66:5447-69. 343 
 344 
14. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. HFEA statement on fertility treatment 'add-345 
ons'. 2016. https://www.hfea.gov.uk/about-us/news-and-press-releases/2016-news-and-press-releases/hfea-346 
statement-on-fertility-treatment-add-ons/, accessed July 2019. 347 
 348 
15. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. The responsible use of treatment add-ons in 349 
fertility services: a consensus statement. 2019. https://www.hfea.gov.uk/media/2792/treatment-add-ons-350 
consensus-statement-final.pdf, accessed July 2019. 351 
 352 
16. Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority. What you need to know about IVF 353 
'add-ons'. 2019. https://www.varta.org.au/resources/blogs/what-you-need-know-about-ivf-add-ons. 354 
 355 
17. Horbst V. 'You cannot do IVF in Africa as in Europe': the making of IVF in Mali and Uganda. 356 
Reprod Biomed Soc Online 2016;2:108-15. 357 
 358 
18. Simpson B. IVF in Sri Lanka: A concise history of regulatory impasse. Reprod Biomed Soc 359 
Online 2016;2:8-15. 360 
 361 
19. European Society for Hum Reprod and Embryology. The funding of IVF treatment.  2017. 362 
https://www.eshre.eu/Press-Room/Resources, accessed July 2019. 363 
 364 
20. Panorama. Inside Britain's Fertility Business. BBC, 2016, 365 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b084ngkd, accessed July 2019. 366 
 367 
21. Harper J, Magli MC, Lundin K, Barratt CLR, Brison D. When and how should new technology 368 
be introduced into the IVF laboratory? Hum Reprod 2012;27:303-13. 369 
 370 
22. Harper J, Jackson E, Sermon K, Aitken RJ, Harbottle S, Mocanu E et al. Adjuncts in the IVF 371 
laboratory: where is the evidence for 'add-on' interventions? Hum Reprod 2017;32:485-91. 372 
 373 
23. Wilkinson J, Bhattacharya S, Duffy J, Kamath MS, Marjoribanks J, Repping S et al. 374 
Reproductive medicine: still more ART than science? BJOG 2019;126:138-41. 375 
 376 
24. Repping S. Evidence-based medicine and infertility treatment. Lancet 2019;393:380-2. 377 
 378 
25. Murdoch A. Should the HFEA be regulating the add-on treatments for IVF/ICSI in the UK?: 379 
AGAINST: HFEA regulation of add-on IVF/ICSI. BJOG 2017;124:1849. 380 
 381 
26. Cohen J, Alikani M. Evidence-based medicine and its application in clinical preimplantation 382 
embryology. Reprod Biomed Online 2013;27:547-61. 383 
 384 
27. Macklon NS, Ahuja KK, Fauser B. Building an evidence base for IVF 'add-ons'. Reprod Biomed 385 
Online 2019;38:853-6. 386 
 387 
28. Prasad VK, Cifu AS. Ending medical reversal : improving outcomes, saving lives. Baltimore: 388 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. 389 
 390 
29. Twisk M, Mastenbroek S, van Wely M, Heineman MJ, Van der Veen F, Repping S. 391 
Preimplantation genetic screening for abnormal number of chromosomes (aneuploidies) in in vitro 392 
fertilisation or intracytoplasmic sperm injection. The Cochrane database of systematic reviews 393 
2006:CD005291. 394 
 395 
30. Glasziou P, Chalmers I, Rawlins M, McCulloch P. When are randomised trials unnecessary? 396 
Picking signal from noise. BMJ 2007;334:349-51. 397 
 398 
31. Evers J. Do we need an RCT for everything? Hum Reprod 2017;32:483-4. 399 
 400 
32. Braakhekke M, Mol F, Mastenbroek S, Mol BW, van der Veen F. Equipoise and the RCT. Hum 401 
Reprod 2017;32:257-60. 402 
 403 
33. Lensen S, Osavlyuk D, Armstrong S, Stadelmann C, Hennes A, Napier E et al. A Randomized 404 
Trial of Endometrial Scratching before In Vitro Fertilization. New England Journal of Medicine 405 
2019;380:325-34. 406 
 407 
34. Lensen S, Venetis C, Ng EHY, Young SL, Vitagliano A, Macklon NS et al. Should we stop 408 
offering endometrial scratching prior to in vitro fertilization? Fertil Steril 2019;111:1094-101. 409 
 410 
35. Singer P, Wells D. In vitro fertilisation: the major issues. J Med Ethics 1983;9:192-9. 411 
 412 
36. Madeira JL, Coyne K, Jaeger AS, Parry JP, Lindheim SR. Inform and consent: more than just 413 
"sign here". Fertil Steril 2017;108:40-1. 414 
 415 
37. Karpin I. Regulatory Responses to the Gendering of Transgenerational Harm. Aust Feminist 416 
Stud 2016;31:139-53. 417 
 418 
38. Blakely B, Williams J, Mayes C, Kerridge I, Lipworth W. Conflicts of interest in Australia's IVF 419 
industry: an empirical analysis and call for action. Hum Fertil (Camb) 2017:1-8. 420 
 421 
39. Mayes C, Blakely B, Kerridge I, Komesaroff P, Olver I, Lipworth W. On the fragility of medical 422 
virtue in a neoliberal context: the case of commercial conflicts of interest in reproductive medicine. 423 
Theor Med Bioeth 2016;37:97-111. 424 
 425 
40. Dondorp W, de Wert G. Innovative reproductive technologies: risks and responsibilities. 426 
Hum Reprod 2011;26:1604-8. 427 
 428 
41. Zolkefli Y. Evaluating the Concept of Choice in Healthcare. Malays J Med Sci 2017;24:92-6. 429 
 430 
42. Provoost V, Tilleman K, D'Angelo A, De Sutter P, de Wert G, Nelen W et al. Beyond the 431 
dichotomy: a tool for distinguishing between experimental, innovative and established treatment. 432 
Hum Reprod 2014;29:413-7. 433 
 434 
43. Glenton C, Santesso N, Rosenbaum S, Nilsen ES, Rader T, Ciapponi A et al. Presenting the 435 
results of Cochrane Systematic Reviews to a consumer audience: a qualitative study. Med Decis 436 
Making 2010;30:566-77. 437 
 438 
44. Alderdice F, McNeill J, Lasserson T, Beller E, Carroll M, Hundley V et al. Do Cochrane 439 
summaries help student midwives understand the findings of Cochrane systematic reviews: the 440 
BRIEF randomised trial. Syst Rev 2016;5:40. 441 
 442 
45. Zemyarska MS. Is it ethical to provide IVF add-ons when there is no evidence of a benefit if 443 
the patient requests it? J Med Ethics 2019;45:346-50. 444 
 445 
46. Gorton M. Review of assisted reproductive treatment. In: Victorian Government, Australia, 446 
2018. 447 
 448 
47. Hodson N, Bewley S. Abuse in assisted reproductive technology: A systematic qualitative 449 
review and typology. Eur J Obstet Gynecol Reprod Bio 2019;238:170-7. 450 
 451 
48. Hendriks S, Vliegenthart R, Repping S, Dancet EAF. Broad support for regulating the clinical 452 
implementation of future reproductive techniques. Hum Reprod 2018;33:39-46. 453 
 454 
